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ABSTRACT
The discipline of modern Islamic economics is currently torn in opposing directions by different visions 
of what its nature should be. On one side, it is argued that modern Islamic economics is too heavily influenced 
by secular economic theory. On the other side, it is argued that an overreliance on theologically-informed 
ideals would render Islamic economics unduly unrealistic. This paper explores the two competing criticisms 
of modern Islamic economics, illustrating how the conflict is played out in the area of Islamic banking. A case 
is tentatively made for greater pluralism in modern Islamic economics as a means of moving the discipline 
forward.
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OVERVIEW AND DEFINITION
Modern Islamic economics arose out of an 
confluence of factors. One factor is the field of fiqh 
dealing trading, lending, and employment contracts, 
state regulations over markets (such as price controls 
and limits on market concentration), and the collection 
and disbursement of tax revenue by the state. Another 
factor is the rise of Islamic ‘reformism’ in late 19th 
century India and Egypt. In the face of colonialism, 
this movement sought to look afresh at sacred 
texts in order to build modern, politico-economic 
structures. Although clearly informed by what they 
saw as unquestionably Islamic ethical principles, the 
reformists sought to incorporate European intellectual 
traditions into their modernizing visions. Thus the 
echoes of liberal, socialist and social democratic 
ideologies can be discerned in the visions of these 
early thinkers (Siddiqi, 1993; Zayd, 2006; Parray, 
* Penulis undangan
2011). A related Islamic ‘revivalist’ movement in the 
20th century opposed such reformism on the grounds 
that it was effectively secularizing and Westernising 
Islamic societies. The revivalist movement led by 
figures such as Sayyid Mawdudi and Mohammad 
Baqir al-Sadr instead called for a self-consciously 
non-Western and explicitly Islamic perspective on all 
matters, including both private and state economic 
institutions (Wilson, 1998; Chapra, 2004). 
Neither the reformists nor the revivalists 
developed systematic theories of economic 
processes; nor did they formulate ‘Islamic’ policies 
based on rigorous empirical knowledge. Rather, their 
thought operated at the level of general ‘visions’ 
of normative politico-economic structures. In the 
1970s, in response to what were perceived to be 
inadequate epistemic foundations for constructing a 
distinctly Islamic ‘worldview’, calls were made for 
the ‘Islamicisation of knowledge’ (Al-Faruqi, 1982). 
This entailed critiquing and replacing foundational 
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As far as the English language literature on 
Islamic economics goes, a survey by Muqorobin 
(2008) shows that modern Islamic economics 
ranges over a wide variety of research topics. 
Macroeconomic topics such as fiscal policy, monetary 
policy and economic development are present, as is 
the construction of models of the macroeconomy. 
There is variety in microeconomic studies too, both 
theoretical and empirical, covering topics such as 
trade, insurance, real estate, trusts, marketing, labour, 
agriculture, corporations, and inheritance.  However, 
work on banking and finance issues is by far the most 
predominant, making up almost 50% of all English 
language publications in Islamic economics over the 
period 1994-2005. It is also worth noting however 
that the second most prominent area of discussion 
– 19% of the English literature – is methodology 
and general theoretical frameworks. This material 
reflects the importance of debates over the evolution 
of Islamic economics. There are many ways in which 
the various methodological concerns and conflicts 
may be categorised. This paper focuses on the 
question of using theories and methods identified as 
‘secular’. On one side are those Muslim economists 
who base their work on secular theories and methods, 
but incorporate some insights from Islamic teachings. 
On the other side are those Muslim economists who 
regard such a framework as being illegitimate because 
it undermines or even violates ethical or epistemic 
principles of (what they regard as) a fully Islamic 
discipline. 
THE CHANGE OF COOPTION
One type of critique of mainstream economics 
is that it falsely presumes its theories and policies to 
be universally applicable irrespective of the cultural, 
religious and societal contexts of people. Arguing that 
Muslim-majority societies produce people who have 
saliently different values, motivations and institutions, 
some Muslim economists have sought to modify the 
tools of mainstream economics to take into account 
these differences. They regard such an approach of 
scientific in the same sense that mainstream economics 
does because it entails the construction of theories 
which seek to describe, explain and predict economic 
phenomena. Such theorizing entails idealization 
and abstraction from reality, and theories are judged 
by the criteria of logical coherence and empirical 
Western categories and concepts with Islamic ones so 
as to entirely reconstruct all disciplinary knowledge 
on an on a sound theological basis. Needless to say, 
knowledge of economics fell within the project’s 
purview. Inspired by the revivalist movement, but 
(usually) trained in the Western tradition of mainstream 
economics, a new breed of Muslim economists began 
to construct modern theoretical representations of 
what an Islamic economy would look like. This latest 
movement has grown apace and now holds regular 
conferences, is represented by the International 
Association for Islamic Economics, has a number of 
specialist journals, has produced numerous books and 
reports, and has facilitated the creation of university 
departments and institutes devoted to research on 
Islamic economic issues (Nagaoka, 2012).   
Like all relatively young disciplines, a consensus 
on the definition of modern Islamic economics has 
not yet emerged. Rahim (2007: 7-9), for example, 
identifies seventeen different definitions. There 
seem to be as many definitions of Islamic economics 
as there are Muslim economists – maybe more. 
Fortunately, Mirakhor (2009: 32) offers a definition 
that captures most of the elements found in these 
various classificatory efforts:
... Islamic economics can be considered as a 
discipline concerned with: (a) the rules of behavior 
(institutions) prescribed by Islam as they relate to 
resource allocation, production, exchange, distribution 
and redistribution; (b) economic implications 
of the operations of these rules and; (c) policy 
recommendations for achieving rules compliance 
that would allow convergence of the actual economy 
to the ideal economic system envisioned by Islam.
One will note that this definition resonates 
with secular definitions of economics by virtue of 
its concern with ‘resource allocation, production, 
exchange, distribution and redistribution’. One may 
further note recognition of the familiar distinction 
between positive and normative realms, but also an 
implicit acknowledgement that the two realms are 
inextricably linked. Ethical foundations prescribe 
the ‘rules’ governing the boundaries of acceptable 
behaviour, but the explicit concern with normative 
policy formulation (how to manifest an ethically 
ideal economy) entails ‘positive’ knowledge of how 
an actual economy operates now and what the actual 
implications of the normative ‘rules’ would be if 
instituted. 
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veracity of predictions. Thus mathematical modeling 
and econometric testing are central methodological 
features of this endeavour. Rather than inventing 
entirely new theories, this approach tends to utilize 
theoretical content from mainstream economics, 
modifying it in various ways in order to ‘Islamicise’ 
it.  
A number of Muslim economists have expressed 
serious concerns about the legitimacy of this approach 
to modern Islamic economics on the grounds that it 
has adopted secular economic theories and methods 
as core features, thereby betraying the ‘Islamicisation 
of knowledge’ project. Thus, so the argument goes, 
modern Islamic economics is not ‘truly’ Islamic 
because it merely borrows, and then cosmetically 
alters, mainstream secular economic theories. This 
criticism grew more strident from the 1990s onwards 
as it became clear that Muslim economists were often 
borrowing heavily from neoclassicism: 
In attempting to ground itself on a theory 
of rational man and a hypothetical-deductive 
methodology … [Islamic economics] has merely 
substituted Islamic terms for neoclassical ones, 
retaining the latter’s assumptions, procedures and 
modes of analysis (Alatas, 1995: 95).
Despite such criticism, this trend seems to have 
continued. In 2011, Zaman summarized the the 
concern thus:  
There is substantial evidence that the development 
of the discipline of Islamic Economics is currently 
in crisis ... [because] most Muslim economists have 
accepted too many of the ideas of Western economists 
uncritically. The methodological framework, and 
underlying assumptions are wrong, and in conflict 
with Islamic views (Zaman, 2011).
Whatever one thinks ‘Islamic views’ amount 
to, there is little doubt that at least some Muslim 
economists, reflecting their training, have assimilated 
mainstream theoretical constructs and models into 
their work. 
For example, with respect to the conceptualization 
of Islamic consumer behaviour, one often finds 
the basic neoclassical theory of the rational utility 
maximizing agent used as a default framework, 
which is then modified to incorporate various Islamic 
themes. The standard neoclassical theory assumes an 
individual consumer maximises utility by choosing 
the most preferred a bundle of commodities given 
the resource available to them. Their preferences 
are exogenously given complete, transitive and 
continuous, and the available resources are limited 
such that the consumer is not satiated. To ‘Islamicise’ 
the theory, some salient modifications can be made. 
One obvious modification is to limit the bundle 
commodities to religiously permissible ones. This 
could be done by specifying preferences such that 
certain forbidden products such as wine, pork, etc. 
are ‘discommodities’ (less is preferred to more), or by 
specifying constraints such that forbidden products, 
despite being commodities, are not available (or have 
a price of infinity). Another possible modification is 
to incorporate preferences for ‘otherworldly goods’ 
– viz. rewards in the hereafter. If it is stipulated that 
there are otherworldly rewards for altruistic acts, 
then charitable purchases for the poor could, for 
example, be classified as a commodity entering into 
the preference set of the consumer. Alternatively, 
there could be a state-mandated poor tax (zakāt) that 
would constrain the private purchasing decisions of 
the consumer. In terms of the ‘metaphysical drive’ 
behind consumer behaviour, the concept of utility 
(thought of in terms of subjective psychological 
satisfaction) could be replaced by the theologically 
objective notion of pious belief.1
Another example of the appropriation of 
microeconomic neoclassical theory is Islamic models 
of private firms. Again, starting with a prioria of a 
profit maximizing firm (usually in the Marshallian-
Pigovian tradition) with diminishing marginal returns 
in the short run and an average cost envelope in the long 
run, various modifications can be made to ‘Islamicise’ 
the theory. These modifications always involve 
firms either voluntarily restricting themselves to the 
production of permissible products or being compelled 
by law to avoid prohibited ones. Other modifications 
can include reconceptualisation of opportunity costs 
so as to include certain social obligations (either 
enforced by the state or by norms), or the relaxation 
of the assumption of profit maximization on the 
grounds that the pious entrepreneur will be interested 
in the welfare of consumers for ethical reasons (rather 
than due to the invisible hand of competition or as a 
mendacious marketing strategy).2
1 For examples of this kind of theorising see Zarqa (1980), 
Kahf (1980), Naqvi (1981) and Khan (1984).
2 For examples of this kind of theorising see Metwally 
(1992) Hasan (1998), Hasan (2002) and Amin and Yusof 
(2003).
4 Trikonomika
Vol. 12, No. 1, Juni 2013
Edward Mariyani-Squire
With respect to macroeconomics, one often 
finds some variation on the neoclassical-Keynesian 
synthesis used the theoretical basis of an ‘Islamic’ 
model of a national economy. For example, the 
IS-LM framework may be used to model a closed 
economy. The aggregate consumption function could 
include a compulsory poor tax (zakāt); and instead 
of incorporating interest rates into the demand for 
money and investment functions, a profit-share ratio 
can be used; the money supply could be assumed to 
be fixed by the central bank. Default fiscal policy 
may be restricted to a balanced discretionary budget, 
and the poor tax could function as an automatic 
stabilizer. Monetary policy could operate through the 
manipulation of investment either via direct control 
over the reserve requirements of banks, or by altering 
its own profit-share ratio with private banks.3
Although it is true that the above modifications 
of orthodox secular economic theory – both micro 
and macro – have a clearly ‘Islamic’ tenor, this work 
has been criticized by for not going far enough. 
In particular, it is argued that some of the core 
features of secular theory remain essential to these 
economic models. With respect to microeconomics, 
for example, although charitable acts could be 
included in the consumer’s utility function, the 
very concept of the utility function is essentially 
grounded in ontological, ethical and methodological 
individualism (cf. Choudhary, 1994). In brief, it may 
be said that rational decision makers behave in an 
outwardly selfless manner for covertly self-centered 
reasons, viz., their own personal satisfaction. In these 
models, agents do not help the poor because it is 
morally right in itself, as per the Islamic conception; 
rather, they do it because they seek satisfaction for 
themselves alone, either now or in the hereafter. As 
for macroeconomics, although some well known 
aspects of Islamic law are incorporated in the models 
(such as the implementation of the compulsory 
poor tax and the prohibition of interest rates), the 
standard orthodox objectives of economic growth, 
low unemployment and stable price rises remain the 
same. With respect to economic growth in particular, 
these models uncritically assume that this is beneficial 
to a nation’s population. Such an assumption is 
questionable in that it presumes that wellbeing – 
3 For examples of this kind of theorising see Mahdi and Al-
Asaly (1991), Yusoff (2006) and Ali and Myles (2010).
both materially and spiritually – is facilitated by 
greater material production and consumption per se. 
It ignores long term environmental effects of capital 
accumulation, the effects on familial and social 
relationships of technological change and the ‘more 
efficient’ operation of labour markets, and the effects 
on culture and spirituality of an increasingly crisis-
ridden materialist, consumption-orientated society 
(cf. Choudhary, 2006; Zaman, 2011). In short, the 
‘Islamic’ augmentations to the standard secular micro 
and macro models are so ad hoc and piecemeal as to 
effectively render the ‘Islamic’ prefix a mere veneer.
THE CHARGE OF IDEALISM
An alternative, more ‘heterodox’ approach to 
modern Islamic economics sees itself as remaining 
faithful to the ‘Islamicisation of knowledge’ project. 
It may be regarded as ‘foundationalist’ in the sense 
that it argues Qur’ānic and Prophetic ontological, 
epistemological and ethical foundations are essential to 
any ‘truly’ Islamic economics. With such foundations 
in place, distinctly Islamic economic institutions 
governing property and labour rights, money, financial 
and goods markets, and state revenue-expenditure 
can be put in place, thereby making manifest the 
good outcomes, both individually and socially, of 
Divine Law. Since all ‘secular’ economics is built 
on different foundations, it methodology and content 
must be rejected outright as fundamentally false and 
morally retrograde. 
For example, Furqani (2010) argues that homo 
economicus, even modified, is unsatisfactory. He 
suggests that human behaviour should be explained 
not in terms of self-interest, but in terms of adherence 
to justice or rights (huqūq); private utility should be 
replaced with the public interest (maslahah) as the 
underlying motivator of behaviour; and rationality 
should be replaced with piety (taqwā) as the principle 
virtue of human beings. Asutay (2007a, 2007b) goes 
further. He argues that homo Islamicus can only 
make sense within a wider Islamic politico-economic 
context. He thus proposes an alternative set of 
‘axioms’ which should inform all Islamic economic 
analyses: recognition of God’s unity and sovereignty 
over all things (tawhīd) and humanity’s vicegerency 
on earth (khilafah). This entails the following of 
a perfected path to social harmony (rububiyyah) 
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that manifests justice and beneficence (al ‘adl wa’l 
ihsan) based on free will (ikhtiyar) constrained 
by obligations of Divine Law (fard). From these 
principles, says Asutay, perfection via purification 
(tazkiyah) and ultimately material and spiritual 
success (falah) will follow. Choudhary (1999, 2003) 
argues that at best ‘mainstream’ Islamic economics 
has only incorporated certain Islamic institutions in 
a piecemeal, ad hoc fashion, rather than developing 
a comprehensive holistic Qur’ānic worldview based 
a unified ontology and epistemology of ultimate 
unity (tawhīdi conception) built on an iterative social 
shuratic process of discovery regulated by majority 
consensus (ijma). Meanwhile Zaman (2011) argues 
that a variety of mainstream economic presumptions 
need to be replaced by Islamic ones which contradict 
them. For example, economics should be about 
transforming human values and institutions, not 
merely describing or explaining or predicting status 
quo actions and outcomes. It should include spiritual 
development and moral education as goals. It should 
be praxis orientated: viz. it should first and foremost 
seek to combat oppression, exploitation and injustice 
both as an end in itself and as a means of gaining 
knowledge. Generosity rather than selfishness should 
be fostered as the ‘default’ characteristic of economic 
agents, and competition alone should be replaced 
with cooperative institutions or at least limitations on 
extreme market competition.  
Given the above criticisms leveled against those 
economists who would seek to utilize ‘Islamicised’ 
versions of orthodox economic theory, why then has 
modern Islamic economics not fulfilled the mission 
of the original ‘Islamicisation of knowledge’ project? 
Why hasn’t an entirely different, thoroughgoing 
‘Islamicised’ theoretical framework emerged in 
order to understand economic phenomena anew and 
formulate innovative economic policies? The answer 
would seem to lie in a general counter-position: viz. 
efforts to build a ‘truly’ theological and juridical 
Islamic economics is infused with a religious 
idealism that gives rise to unrealistic predictions and 
prescriptions. 
With respect to theories, often the claims to the 
‘demonstrable’ superiority of Islamic economics-
based institutions are based on deductions from 
axiomatic constructs. These axioms are either taken 
to be self-evidently true or are stipulated as ideal 
theoretical benchmarks. They usually posit imaginary, 
perfectly pious agents and institutions that follow the 
sharī’ah (as understood by the author positing the 
axioms). 
For example, in his discussion of the definition 
of Islamic economics, Arif (1985a: 84) posits the 
following: 
The representative economic unit in an Islamic 
society is a Muslim – one obedient to Allah. ... [H]
e always follows the injunctions and the rules of the 
Shari’ah in all walks of his life. ... If we accept that 
the Islamic economic system is based on Shari’ah 
paradigm, then what interests us, as economists, is 
the behaviour of the [Muslim] economic agents in an 
Islamic society. 
However, there is almost unanimous consensus 
that no actually existing nation-state is populated 
entirely (or even substantially) by people who 
‘always follows the injunctions and the rules of 
the Shari’ah in all walks of ... life’. Nor are any 
actually existing nation-states’ laws entirely based 
on and perfectly implemented in accordance with the 
sharī’ah (however it is conceived). This being so, 
Arif’s ideal conception of Islamic economics would 
mean that theory would be restricted to ‘explaining’ 
the behaviour of non-existent agents in a non-existent 
economic system. For such a theoretical construct, 
‘tests’ based on econometrically specified models 
would be of very limited value because such models 
rely on data derived from non-ideal states that do not 
conform to the crucial ideal conditions. In short, such 
idealisations are strictly empirically unfalsifiable. For 
this reason, the only relevant criteria by which an 
idealized axiomatic Islamic economic theory could 
be judged would be: (a) internal logical coherence 
and (b) the degree of correspondence to a preferred 
interpretation of religious texts (Qur’ān, ah ādīth, and 
perhaps selected works of fiqh). 
Criterion (b) in particular gives rise to at least two 
challenges. One is the fact that the Qur’ān, ah ādīth, 
and the works of fiqh are extremely wide ranging, and 
especially in the case of fiqh, reflect diverse opinions 
on many topics. Further, a truly ideal model would 
need to incorporate all the relevant elements relating 
to economic concerns. It would be insufficient, for 
example, to construct an economic theory that only 
abolished interest from the banking sector. This would 
give at best a highly incomplete ‘Islamicisation’ of 
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theory, and at worst would amount to an ad hoc and 
piecemeal representation to Islam itself. A ‘truly’ 
Islamic economic theory would have to incorporate a 
variety of sub-theories including: permissible labour 
contracts, trade contracts, loan contracts, land tenure 
contracts, the conditions under which regulations over 
market prices are permissible in the cases of gluts 
and shortages, possible regulations over oligopolistic 
collusion and monopolistic and monopsonistic 
behaviour, a permissible system of taxation and 
revenue disbursement, the permissibility of public 
works by the state and private trusts. Also, various 
final economic objectives to be met by the acceptable 
means would also need to incorporated, including 
for example: poverty alleviation, employment, 
price stability, environmental sustainability, non-
exploitation, and social harmony. The general 
economic theory would need to ensure that the 
combined sub-theories of permissible behaviour 
generate outcomes corresponding to the final 
objectives. This is an exceedingly tall order. 
The other challenge is the delicate question of the 
correct interpretation of religious texts, and who has 
the authority to interpret the texts. It is well known 
that there are many ways in which religious texts can 
be read, and so an extremely wide variety of possible 
implications to be derived from them. One way in 
which the variety can be limited, but certainly not 
eliminated, is to say that hermeneutic authority lies 
exclusively with the orthodox and qualified scholars 
(‘ulamā‘) alone. Others however, may argue that in 
the modern period, the ‘ulamā‘ have not come to grips 
with the scientific and technical knowledge required to 
render relevant judgments in an exceedingly complex, 
ever-changing economic system. For example, some 
argue that fatāwā identifying ribā with bank interest 
(as opposed to usurious rates) is based on a mistaken 
conflation of the modern economic concept of interest 
with medieval conceptions of money and money 
lending practices that are largely inapplicable in the 
modern period (e.g. Rahman, 1964; Saeed, 1999; 
Kuran, 2004; Shams, 2004; Šrámek, 2009). 
One may seek to counter the criticism of 
empirically innocent idealisation by arguing that 
actually existing Muslim-majority societies can be 
progressively altered to conform to the ideal simply by 
imposing sharī’ah-based regulations and institutions. 
However, it may be counter-argued that beliefs about 
the beneficial results of such reforms are still overly 
optimistic, even to the point of being naïve. Such 
skepticism is grounded in the observation that the 
behaviour of ‘actually existing’ Muslim institutions 
and agents may turn out to be crucially at variance with 
the theoretically ideal Islamic institutions and agents 
assumed by advocates of sharī’ah-based policies. 
This is one of the main complaints that Kuran (1986, 
1989, 1995) makes of Islamic economics. Holding 
to a decidedly more pessimistic view of human 
nature than Islamic economics, Kuran argues that the 
acquisitive motive cannot be discounted if one wants 
to give a realistic account of and make plausible 
predictions about any society, including one populated 
by Muslims.4 On this view, it is entirely possible that 
at least some citizens populating a real Islamic state 
may behave in strategically self-centred ways so as 
to avoid or even manipulate sharī’ah rules to their 
own economic advantage. Since advocates of Islamic 
economics sometimes do not seriously contemplate 
this possibility, they may be blind to, or may even end 
up defending and promoting institutions and policies 
that in fact (inadvertently) undermine Islamic ethical 
principles. 
Take the example of zakāt. Zakāt is a religiously 
mandatory tax that is paid annually by Muslims 
with sufficient wealth (of certain specified forms) 
to a variety of stipulated recipients.5 It is widely 
held that if this tax were collected and distributed 
4 This is not to say that Kuran regards people, Muslims 
included, as essentially selfish and nefarious strategists. 
Rather, he seems to assume a dualistic human nature – one 
that is torn between selfless and selfish motives, where a 
sense of (socially mediated) guilt can play a motivating 
role.  
5 In the Shafi’i madhhab, the forms of wealth liable for 
zakāt including tax rates are: agricultural livestock 
(1-3.75%), gold/silver excluding jewellery (2.5%), found 
or mined gold/silver (20%), trade goods (2.5%), non-
irrigated staple food crops produced in that year (10%), 
irrigated staple food crops produced in that year (5%). 
Eligible recipients of zakāt payments include poor and the 
involuntarily unemployed Muslims, zakāt administrators, 
recent converts rejected by their families, Muslims with 
weak faith or who have peers that may convert (including 
teachers and proselytisers), Muslim slaves so they can 
purchase their own freedom, Muslims in debt for morally 
good reasons, unpaid Muslim military volunteers, and 
Muslim travellers in need of money (see Nawawi & 
Keller, 2004: 71-79).
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systematically in accordance with the sharī’ah, 
then the degree of income inequality and poverty 
plaguing many Muslim-majority countries could be 
substantially diminished (Khan, 1991: 259; Mahdi 
& Al-Asaly, 1991: 65). However, aside from the fact 
that there is no consensus in the modern period on 
who, Islamically speaking, is ‘poor’, there is also no 
consensus on precisely how zakāt proceeds are to be 
divided up between worthy potential recipients. This 
leaves room for the possibility of selfish strategic 
decision making. For example, it is entirely possible 
for less-than-perfect zakāt administrators to distribute 
a disproportionate amount of revenue to themselves 
based on the legally legitimate claim that they should 
be paid a ‘fair’ money wage commensurate with 
comparable administrative positions. They may also 
entirely legitimately devote a large proportion of 
zakāt proceeds to teachers and students of private 
Islamic schools, which may happen to be attended 
by the children of the nation’s economic elite. What 
little remains of the zakāt funds would then go to the 
destitute. Ironically, the result could be that a halāl 
disbursement of zakāt, which is rhetorically touted 
as the poor’s claim on the resources of the wealthy, 
actually benefits the wealthy to a greater extent 
than the poor. A defense of a halāl disbursement of 
zakāt by proponents of Islamic economics on the 
theoretical assumption that agents are perfectly pious 
and altruistic when it comes to zakāt, could thereby 
end up defending systematic increases in economic 
inequality, to say nothing of further entrenching 
structural inequalities via subsidisation of the 
education of the economic elite’s children.6
Khan (1991: 259) acknowledges that there can 
be and in fact are problems with the administration of 
zakāt, but seems to believe this is the only barrier to 
zakāt ‘providing social security, eradicating poverty, 
and stimulating the economy.’ This, however, is also 
overly optimistic and idealistic. A simple empirical 
examination of the application of the traditional criteria 
for sourcing zakāt funds in the modern world reveals 
that the monies generated in a number of Muslim-
majority countries are woefully inadequate to deal 
with the substantial rates of poverty they face. Kahf 
(1989: 16), for example, reported that as ... applied on 
livestock, agriculture, mining and monetary holdings, 
6 For depressing evidence of this in Malaysia’s state-run 
distribution of zakāt funds, see Kuran (2004: 25).
Zakat proceeds [for Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and Turkey] would be 
between 0.9% and 2% [of nominal GDP] (except in 
Sudan where it is 4.3%). ... Hence, even if all of Zakat 
is given to the poor, it will not be sufficient to provide 
them with minimum biological sustenance in most 
Muslim countries today, let alone enriching them.
Even if a more liberal criterion for sourcing zakāt 
funds is used (which includes salaries taxed at 2.5%, 
fixed capital and net returns thereon taxed at up to 
10%), the funds generated – between 1.7% and 7.5% 
of GDP – would still be inadequate given the relatively 
high poverty rates and relatively low levels of GDP 
per capita in many Muslim-majority countries (Kahf, 
1989: 18). An examination of national accounts up to 
2007 reveals these results to be little different, ranging 
from ~1.3% of nominal GDP for Saudi Arabia to ~7% 
of nominal GDP for Syria. Taking the most poverty-
striken case of Sudan, where 44% of the population 
in 2007 lived on less than US$2 per day, if all Sudan’s 
potential zakāt revenue went to the poor, then each 
poor person would receive only US$172. Comparing 
that to the Gross National Income per person in 
2007, which was a meager US$2160, one realizes 
that the institution of zakāt does not even begin to 
ameliorate let alone eliminate poverty in Sudan. 
Worse, the structural shifts in capital formation 
mean that the traditional zakāt structure could in 
fact promote greater inequality because it is mostly 
poor households (effectively peasants) in many 
Muslim majority countries who are concentrated in 
zakāt-liable agricultural production, whereas wealthy 
households are concentrated in the growing zakāt-
free manufacturing and services sectors. 
In sum, although the ‘Islamicisation of knowledge’ 
project for modern Islamic economics may be well-
intentioned, without empirical knowledge of what can 
and does occur in actually existing Muslim-majority 
societies, its prescriptions are liable to verge on the 
utopian, and the implementation of them is liable 
to lead to harmful unintended outcomes which are 
morally unacceptable by Islamic standards.
CONFLICT OVER ISLAMIC BANKING
The conflicting perspectives on the appropriate 
direction for Islamic economics is borne out most 
starkly in the area that has most preoccupied the 
discipline of Islamic economics – viz. banking theory 
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and practice. On one side it is argued that Islamic 
banking is insufficiently ‘Islamicised’ because it has 
evolved in a way that essentially mimics conventional 
banking. On the other side it is argued that in order 
to have a viable Islamic banking sector, it has been 
necessary to respond to the realities of the market 
place – that the idealized account of Islamic banking 
simply cannot exist in the real world. 
The charge of mimicry
In theory, an Islamic bank functions as a 
coordinating intermediary between depositors with 
excess capital and capital-poor entrepreneurs. The 
bank acts on behalf of depositors to select potentially 
profitable sharī’ah-compliant ventures in which to 
invest. The bank is passive in the sense that it waits 
for entrepreneurs to offer-up ventures rather than 
seeking them out, but is active in the marketplace in 
the sense that it seeks to attract ventures by means of 
a variety of competitive product-contracts. The main 
types of contracts would include partnership-based 
contracts (mushārakah and mud ārabah),7 asset sale-
based contracts (murābahah, al-ijārah wa iqtinā, bay’ 
bi taman ājil),8 and collateral-based contracts (rahn 
7  For mushārakah contracts, both the bank and the active 
entrepreneur invest some amount of capital into the 
business. The bank acquires some share of whatever 
profits-losses are made by the business in accordance with 
the share of capital provided minus some amount that goes 
to the entrepreneur for their efforts and skill. The operating 
capital provided can change, as can the profit-loss share if 
provision is made for such change in the contract. For mud 
ārabah contracts, the bank provides all the initial capital 
and the entrepreneur utilises it. Profit from the business is 
shared according to pre-specified proportions negotiated 
before the contract is written. This will usually specify 
some amount (or percentage) of profit that goes to the 
entrepreneur for their efforts and skill with the remainder 
going to the bank. All losses are borne by the bank.
8 For murābahah contracts the bank gives money to an 
individual to purchase an asset at the market price P. The 
asset is formally owned by the bank, who then on-sells 
it to the individual at an agreed price P*=P(1+m) where 
m is a percentage profit mark-up. The other contracts are 
variants on this structure. For bay’ bi taman ājil (deferred 
payment sale, also known as bay’ al-muajjal) contracts, 
the bank buys an asset at market price P on behalf of an 
individual who then incrementally purchases the asset from 
the bank over some agreed period of time to the value of 
the original purchase price plus a percentage profit mark-
up. For al-ijārah wa iqtinā (rent and purchase) contracts, 
the bank buys an asset (chosen by the customer) at market 
and bay’ al-‘īnah).9 
In theory, what defines these contracts as ‘Islamic’ 
is that they comply with the following conditions: 
they are based on the sale/purchase of (a) a physically 
existing halāl asset and (b) there is a proportional 
sharing of losses and a voluntarily agreed upon sharing 
of profits between fully informed parties. This entails 
a prohibition on ribā (interpreted as usurious interest 
payments or interest payments per se), gambling, 
including price speculation (maysir), and ambiguity 
in essential terms or conditions of a contract (ghurūr) 
(see El Hawary, Grais & Iqbal, 2004: 5; van Greuning 
& Iqbal, 2008: 6-10).
In theory, thanks to these well-known conditions, 
it is fairly clear what is permitted and forbidden in 
the sharī’ah with respect to trade and financial 
transactions. This gives the legal certainty required 
for rational investment and savings decision making 
through time and thereby provides the basis for greater 
economic stability. To ensure that their products are 
in conformity with the sharī’ah, Islamic banks must 
consult with and gain approval from one or more 
recognized Islamic jurists. 
Mushārakah and mud ārabah (partnership) 
contracts are widely regarded as the ideal halāl 
banking products, and in the 1970s were optimistically 
projected to become the predominant kind of contract 
offered by Islamic banks. Banks would act as the 
representatives of the investor-depositors who would 
effectively be shareholders in business ventures 
for which capital was provided by banks. The 
actual economic profits and losses would be shared 
according to the proportion of capital contributed by 
the bank. This was regarded as the ‘essence’ of Islamic 
banking on the basis of elementary ethical claims: 
since there is a partnership arrangement, profits and 
price P and rents it to the customer over a specified 
period, thereby paying total rent of amount rP where r is a 
percentage rental rate. The customer contracts to purchase 
the asset at the end of the specified period for P. Thus the 
customer will effectively pay the original purchase price 
plus rental mark-up P(1+m). 
9 For rahn contracts, the bank holds an individual’s asset as 
collateral, giving the individual some agreed amount of 
money as a ‘benevolent’ loan which they then pay back 
at some future agreed upon date (whereupon they obtain 
their asset back). For bay’ al ‘inah contracts, an individual 
sells an asset to the bank at a market price P, and at a 
later date the bank sells the asset back to the individual for 
P+M. 
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losses are shared fairly; the banks would not ‘exploit’ 
or ‘destroy’ an unfortunate ‘borrower’; and the bank 
depositors (the principal ‘lenders’) would not obtain 
a risk-free return for no effort, thereby avoiding the 
connotation of a parasitical relationship (Boudjellal, 
2006).
In practice, however, it has turned out that 
partnership contracts in fact comprise a tiny fraction 
of total assets of major Islamic banks. Šrámek (2009), 
for example, found that less than 10% of total assets of 
18 Islamic banks from around the world were devoted 
to genuine profit-loss sharing contracts. Most loanable 
funds are instead devoted to murābahah (asset sale 
debt-based) contracts. Yousef (2004) calls this the 
‘murābahah syndrome’. Šrámek’s research suggests 
only the slightest of changes in the proportion of such 
contracts from 2003 to 2007 (with the exception of 
Indonesia). Profit-loss sharing partnership contracts 
are thus only the ‘essence’ of Islamic banking in the 
marketing sense; they are not really essential to the 
existence of Islamic banking. 
Aside from the disjuncture between the public 
face of Islamic banking and the reality of its practices, 
there is also criticism of murābahah-type contracts 
in themselves. The criticism of such contracts is that 
they seem to violate some basic substantive features 
of traditional Islamic trade contracts upon which they 
are based. The major problematic features of such 
contracts are that, in practice, (a) the potential buyer 
of an asset from the bank (which the bank funded) 
is contractually obliged to purchase the asset when 
offered; (b) the bank is generally guaranteed regular 
profit or rental payments by the customer; (c) the bank 
generally avoids risk of loss by means of insurance 
or stipulations in the contract that place risk-burdens 
(such as due to damage) on the customer; (d) the 
profit or rental payments are unpredictable in those 
cases where the bank contractually stipulates the right 
to alter the profit/rental rate in each new payment 
period; (e) the changes in profit/rental payments 
need not be tailored to the income capacity of the 
customer; and (f) the profit or rental rates  amount 
to interest rates (Saeed, 1998). All of these features 
are explicitly prohibited on a traditional interpretation 
of the sharī’ah. Point (f) – perhaps the most visibly 
controversial feature of modern contracts – becomes 
transparent when banks’ ‘profit’ and ‘rental’ rates are 
explicitly linked to the same interest rate benchmarks 
used by conventional banks. For example, Pakistani 
Islamic banks link the profit ratios in their contracts 
to the Karachi Inter Banks Offered Rates (KIBOR). 
Similarly, the Dubai Islamic Bank calculates its 
rates based on the Emirates Interbank Offered Rate 
(EIBOR). The same is true with the sovereign sukūk 
bonds of Qatar, Malaysia and Pakistan, which peg 
their rates to the LIBOR or the KIBOR (Siddiqui, 
2006).10 
Further, there are also questions about whether 
the most favored mushārakah and mud ārabah 
contracts really live up to the ‘spirit’ of the sharī’ah 
in practice. In the case of mud ārabah contracts, 
although originally envisioned to be venture-capital 
contracts in which the entrepreneur would have free-
reign, such contracts in fact appear to be mainly 
used for short-term trading activities for specific 
goods, and are fairly strictly controlled by the bank 
(including the time period and management of the 
venture). Further, such contracts are usually written in 
such a way that the bank can seek damages from the 
customer-entrepreneur if the contract is terminated 
by the latter (usually due to a failure of the venture). 
By these means, the bank shifts risks to the customer-
entrepreneur and ensures a known return on its capital. 
Similarly, for mushārakah contracts, banks seem 
10 These criticisms apply to the other asset sale-based 
contracts too. For al-ijārah wa iqtinā and bay’ bi taman ājil 
(deferred payment sale) contracts, which often function as 
real estate and personal loans, the bank, being the initial 
majority owner of the asset (say, a house or a car), decides 
the future value of the asset and the increments to be paid 
by the customer in order to gradually become the owner 
of the asset and charges a rental rate to the customer (the 
purchaser) for the use of the asset. This rental rate is highly 
correlated to the home-loan or personal loan interest rates 
of conventional banks. For example, Islamic financial 
institutions in Australia calculate their ‘rental’ rates based 
on the Reserve Bank of Australia’s official cash rate or 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) (Ahmad 
& Shahed, 2010). Further, the rental rate is virtually a 
compulsory payment that is largely independent of the 
financial circumstances of the customer (except in extreme 
circumstances), similar to conventional banks. With 
respect to rahn contracts which are popular in Malaysia, 
these essentially amount to pawn broking instruments that 
turn out to be less than ‘benevolent’ loans: banks charge 
customers a custodianship fee for holding the collateral 
that is directly related to the size of the loan and positively 
correlated with conventional bank interest rates (Dusuki 
& Abozaid, 2007).
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to issue such contracts in a manner than effectively 
minimises their risks (ensuring expected returns) 
by shifting risks onto the customer-entrepreneur. As 
Saeed (1998: 92) put it:
Under Islamic banking, although musharaka is 
used in several forms, it is the short-term commercial 
form which has become prominent, where the 
contract is closely related to the purchase and sale of 
certain specified goods. The commercial musharaka 
enables the bank to recover its capital, plus return, 
without much uncertainty or risk. The partner [i.e. the 
customer-entrepreneur] is restricted, in his actions by 
the detailed terms of the contract, which do not leave 
him much freedom to conduct a musharaka in the real 
sense of the term as developed in fiqh [i.e. Islamic 
jurisprudence]. From the terms of the contracts of 
Islamic banks, it appears that the partner’s function 
is to sell the goods involved at the price specified 
by the bank, in order to realise the return the bank is 
aiming at. The bank’s share of capital and its return 
thereon is reasonably well protected by various forms 
of guarantees and terms of the contract. The bank also 
seeks various forms of guarantee to protect its interest 
in the venture and appears to attempt, where possible, 
to put a significant number of risks associated with 
the management of the musharaka onto the partner. 
If this is the case, the general charge that since 
all Islamic bank products – including modern 
mushārakah and mud ārabah contracts – function in 
a similar way to conventional loans seems to carry 
weight. From this it would follow that although 
Islamic banking technically complies with sharī’ah 
regulations such as the prohibition on interest 
income and on the financing of harām activities, the 
substantive intentions of the sharī’ah are ignored in 
practice (cf. Dusuki & Abozaid, 2007; Choudhury, 
2008; Zaman, 2011; Asutay 2012). 
Another criticism of Islamic banking in practice 
is that Islamic banks, contra conventional banks, 
are supposed to be particularly concerned with just 
socio-economically outcomes. Greater equality in 
the distribution of income and wealth, fair dealings 
by risk-sharing, ethical investment, and development 
programmes are regarded as distinctive normative 
features of Islamic banking. However, in practice, 
Islamic banks appear not to have lived up to these 
aspirations. Examining 25 countries, Asutay (2010) 
found no correlation between the growth of Islamic 
banking assets and changes in human development 
indices for any of these countries. He thus concluded 
Islamic banks have simply not contributed to 
investment in those fields that would foster economic 
development. Instead, just like conventional 
banks, rather than fighting the phenomenon of 
‘financialisation’ that has gripped the US and 
Europe, Islamic banks have been willing and active 
participants in it (Asutay, 2012). It seems clear that the 
novel financial products such as tawarruq contracts,11 
ṣukūk bonds, ‘Islamic’ derivatives and ‘Islamic’ 
futures – products only nominally connected to the 
real economy – have not been developed in order to 
benefit the poor, or to assist local small businesses, 
or in any way to generate domestic economic 
development, but rather are tailor-made to facilitate 
wealth-generation for corporations and the economic 
elite. Indeed, products that would help the poor such 
as microfinance loans and charitable loan contracts 
(qard al-hassan)12 appear to be unambiguously 
eschewed by Islamic banks (Rahman, 2007: 128-129; 
Jan, 2011).
Finally, it is argued by some that the institutional 
mechanisms by which new financial products are 
approved – viz. via banks’ own sharī’ah advisory 
boards – do not function according to the ideals of 
11 Tawarruq contracts basically operate in the following 
manner. A bank purchases an asset in a commodity market 
(steel, grain, gold, or whatever) at price P, immediately 
sells the asset to an entrepreneur at a mark-up P+M to be 
paid back over some period of time, and the entrepreneur 
immediately sells the asset in the market again at P. 
The entire set of transactions is normally facilitated by 
the bank. The entrepreneur thereby acquires money (P) 
quickly along with a debt (P+M). Businesses sometimes 
enter into such contracts when they face short-term 
liquidity problems. Loans for such purposes are generally 
regarded as being prohibited to Muslims, but since this 
is not technically a loan it may be regarded as a legal 
stratagem to avoiding condemnation. See Nagaoka (2012: 
127-129).
12 Qard al-hassan loans are ‘charitable’ loans in the sense that 
they entail no requirement of compensation, mark-up, etc. 
for the lender. The borrower should seek to pay back the 
amount lent either in instalments or as a lump-sum when 
they are able to (as determined by themselves). Although 
the lender can make no demands on the borrower over 
and above the principle lent, the borrower may voluntarily 
choose to reward the lender for their generosity by gifting 
them some amount of money after the loan has been 
repaid.   
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theory. Two important problems are the following. 
First, at present a relatively small number of Islamic 
legal scholars specializing in financial matters 
dominate the lucrative ‘fatwtā market’. This gives 
rise to the danger of a perception of scholars being 
‘purchased’ or at least subjected to the temptation of 
moral hazard (Khan, 2010; Ünal, 2010). Second, there 
is not perfect consensus (ijmā’) on all matters relating 
to Islamic banking – especially new developments. 
There are a variety of scholarly opinions available 
on what can count as a valid form of contract. And 
sometimes past judgements by particular scholars or 
boards are reversed (Briault, 2007; Al-Amine, 2008; 
Malik, Malik & Mustafa, 2011; Nagaoka, 2012). It 
is not unreasonable to suggest that as the number of 
scholars of sharī’ah grows with industry demand, 
the variety of innovative and divergent fatāwā will 
similarly grow. This undermines the certainties 
that are supposed to be provided by sharī’ah-based 
transactions. 
The Case for Pragmatism
Countering the above criticisms, some Muslim 
economists argue that in the real world of an 
increasingly global, competitive, and technologically 
advanced banking industry, it is simply not possible 
to maintain the standards embodied in the idealised 
theory of Islamic banking. Pragmatic compromises 
based on empirical realities need to be made in order 
for Islamic banking to exist at all. To remain viable 
private enterprises, Islamic banks must take into 
account and respond to the actual wants and needs 
of their potential clients. Since those clients do not 
themselves perfectly conform to the assumptions 
of theologically informed theory, to survive Islamic 
banks must modify their practices to take this fact 
into account. 
The various potential clients of Islamic banks 
do not function in the same way as theory posits. 
In theory, potential depositors are of two types: 
households driven by a transactions motive and ‘first-
tier’ investors driven by a profit motive. The former 
would have the nominal value of their deposits 
ensured, but would receive no return, as they would 
only be using the bank as a convenient way of 
temporarily holding money for transaction purposes. 
Investor-deposits would thus be the only source of 
funds for ‘second-tier’ investment. The return would 
not be fixed, but would rather depend on the share of 
profit garnered on their behalf by the bank investing 
in capital-poor businesses. In theory, ‘second-tier’ 
capital-poor clients are predominantly entrepreneurs 
seeking capital for permissible, productive investment 
in business ventures. They would honestly share their 
profits-losses with ‘first-tier’ investors, as facilitated 
by the banks. Since there is a correspondence between 
the risk preferences of the first and second tier 
investor-clients, and since household-clients make 
deposits for non-pecuniary reasons, the system should 
function relatively smoothly (Khan & Mirakhor, 
1989; Mirakhor, 2007, 2009).
In actuality, however, households are likely to 
be driven by transactions and precautionary motives, 
and first-tier investors are likely to be looking for 
relatively safe short-term returns on surplus capital 
(otherwise they would use their surpluses to invest 
in risky business ventures directly). Thus, both types 
of depositors are in fact likely to expect fairly stable 
returns on their deposits: households will expect stable 
returns to guard against the erosion of purchasing 
power, and investors will expect stable returns in 
order to minimise opportunity costs. Real depositors 
will thus tend to be relatively risk-averse.13
Potential second-tier capital-poor clients on 
the other hand, are entrepreneurs seeking capital 
for investment and households seeking capital for 
durable consumption goods (including dwellings). 
If Islamic banks were to specialise in profit-loss 
sharing partnership-based contracts (mushārakah 
or muṣārabah), as the theorists of Islamic banking 
expected, then households would effectively be ruled 
out as potential clients (unless they were willing 
to treat their real estate purchases as speculative 
investments). This would leave only entrepreneurial 
investors as second-tier clients. That means banks 
would be entering into undertakings that are, for a 
number of reasons, inherently risky – and certainly 
riskier than conventional loan contracts. This is 
because the banks would face adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems in ways that conventional 
banks would not. Adverse selection arises because an 
entrepreneur taking on a high risk investment would 
prefer a loss-sharing contract over a conventional 
loan, and conversely, would prefer a conventional 
13 To illustrate the point empirically, see Kasri & Kassim 
(2009) for an analysis of the determinants of savings in 
Indonesian Islamic banks.
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loan for a low risk investment. Thus Islamic banks 
would tend to attract only high risk investors. Moral 
hazard arises because it is always possible for less-
than-perfect entrepreneurs to artificially inflate their 
costs in ways that enrich themselves and yet ‘on paper’ 
generate losses for their businesses. In this case, the 
bank would bear an explicit loss and the entrepreneur 
would make a covert gain (at the expense of the 
bank). To guard against such moral hazard, Islamic 
banks would have to engage in detailed monitoring of 
their partnerships, which would substantially increase 
their transaction and enforcement costs relative to 
conventional banks with which they compete. In 
sum, if entrepreneurs are not entirely honest and 
selflessly committed to Islamic ideals, profit-loss 
sharing partnership contracts may not merely be less 
profitable than the non-ideal contracts, but may in fact 
be loss-generating for banks (cf. Khan, 1989; Kuran, 
1995; Adnan & Muhammad, 2007). 
The above real-world problem is the underlying 
reason why Islamic banks, whatever their initial noble 
intentions, have ended up resembling conventional 
banks by focusing on murābahah-type quasi-
debt-based products and various kinds of quasi-
conventional securities trading. It is also why banks 
offer deposit and lending rates that track conventional 
interest rates; why they introduce service fees and 
charges; and why they engage in risk-shifting when 
writing contracts (cf. Yousef, 2004). It is also the 
prima facie reason why Islamic banks, contra the 
ideal, have avoided relatively poor entrepreneurs who 
wish to establish small businesses in agriculture and 
manufacturing and why they avoid giving charitable 
loans to the poor: at best such loans generate no profit, 
and in aggregate may result in losses for depositors 
(and owners).14 
In short, the murābahah-type products, to the near 
exclusion of all other sharī’ah-compliant products, 
ensure stable and predictable returns in order to 
satisfy the preferences of risk-averse depositors, to 
remain competitive against conventional banks, and 
to avoid the possibility of insolvency in an economic 
downturn. 
14 As Rahman (2007: 128-129) puts it with respect to 
microfinance: ‘Concerns about the lack of real profitability 
of microfinance prevented banks from getting involved in 
microfinance. The inherent risks posed by microfinance 
and the widespread belief that the poor are poor because 
of their lack of skills, has kept traditional banks, including 
Islamic banks, away from microfinance.’
Can the divergence between the theoretical 
ideal and the actuality of Islamic banking be justified 
on Islamic legal grounds? The pragmatic position 
answers in the affirmative on two grounds. One 
argument appeals to the principle of maslahah – that 
is, an action is permissible if it secures moral benefits 
and/or prevents moral harm to the society, or more 
generally, ensures net social moral benefits. It may be 
argued that despite the imperfections in Islamic bank 
loan practices, they are nonetheless morally superior 
to the alternative because they avoid compound 
interest, are not as harmful to ostensible ‘borrowers’ 
who fall on hard times, avoid purchase of products or 
investment in harām businesses, and avoid extreme 
forms of destabilising speculation such as Ponzi 
schemes. In other words, Islamic banking may be 
classified as a ‘lesser evil’, which is always preferable 
to a ‘greater evil’. The other argument relies on the 
claim to necessity (darūrah). Private Islamic banks 
are compelled to operate and compete in a globalised 
financial network which includes transnational, 
central and conventional local banks that operate 
according to principles of interest-bearing loans. For 
this reason, it is simply not possible for Islamic banks 
to completely avoid paying interest itself to other 
conventional institutions; nor can it avoid taking such 
interest payments into account when constructing its 
own products. Thus, so the argument goes, the legal 
maxim ‘Necessity permits that which is forbidden’ 
(darūrah tubih al-mahzurat) may be said to apply, 
and a dispensation (rukhsa) would be given to Islamic 
banks. Until and unless a sufficiently comprehensive 
parallel banking and financial system comes into 
existence, Islamic banks may appeal to the darūrah 
maxim. 
Dusuki & Abozaid (2007) dismiss these kinds 
of arguments on the grounds that insofar as the 
innovative ‘Islamic’ financial products violate the 
‘substance’ of sharī’ah – and for them, the innovations 
do just that – then the appeals to the maslahah and 
darūrah arguments are unsound. On the other hand, 
it must also be borne in mind that the fatāwā that 
sanction the various innovative practices developed 
by Islamic banks are not the product of ignorant 
and unqualified or mendacious amateurs. With the 
possible exceptions of some tawarruq, and bay’ al-
dayn underlying some sukūk,15 innovations are in 
fact supported by genuine legal arguments based 
15 See Rosly & Sanusi (1999) and Hosen & Nahrawi (2012).
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on the traditional methodologies of the established 
schools (madhāhib) of jurisprudence. Indeed, as 
Kahf (2004) points out, Islamic banks have tended 
to favour ‘traditional’ madhhab-following scholars 
over ‘modernist’ or ‘revivalist’ academics and 
proselytizers. Critics might not like murābahah-type 
contracts, may feel that they violate the ‘spirit’ of the 
Qur’ānic message and the Prophetic teachings, may 
believe them to be a capitulation to Western financial 
interests, and may judge them to be only cosmetically 
‘Islamic’, but none of that changes the fact that these 
contracts are backed by authentic fatāwā written and 
vetted by established scholarly individuals and bodies 
using traditional methodologies of fiqh. To effectively 
claim or imply that these fatāwā are deviant and 
without genuine legitimacy – especially when it is 
made by critics who are not themselves formally 
trained in the time-honoured traditions of one of the 
madhāhib – is not merely unconvincing in legal terms, 
but more broadly, is tantamount to calling a number 
of important national and international scholarly 
institutions heretical.16 Needless to say, such a claim 
would be extreme.
CRITICAL REFLECTION
A criticism that may be made of both of the above 
identified contending strands in Islamic economics 
is that they both seem to have a quite restricted 
conception of ‘secular’ economics. Too often, 
proponents of both sides identify ‘secular’ economics 
almost exclusively with a quite narrow conception of 
neoclassical micro and macro economics. One stand 
seeks to accommodate and modify it and the other 
stand rejects it outright – both apparently thinking 
that this is all there is to ‘secular’ economics. This 
entails two unhelpfully restrictive oversights. 
Heterogeneity in Secular Economics 
The first oversight is that neoclassicism is in fact 
an internally contested paradigm – there are different 
interpretations of what it claims, what it implies, and 
how it is developing. Critics often seem to focus 
16 These institutions include the Fiqh Academy of the 
Organisation of Islamic Countries, the Sharī’ah Board 
of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institutions, the Sharī’ah Supervisory Advisory 
Panel of the International Islamic Financial Market, the 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia, and the Islamic Banking and 
Finance Institute Malaysia.
on an interpretation that is prevalent in popular 
undergraduate US textbooks or one that is closely 
associated with the Chicago School. For example, 
Haneef & Furqani (2009: 180-181) claim that:
Mainstream economics has established “homo 
economicus” or “economic man” as the ideal type of 
economic agent who will apply all assumptions of 
economics in real life.... 
Homo economicus is conceived as an individual 
who acts rationally by pursuing his own self interest 
and maximising his own utility. A person is seen as 
maximising his utility function, which depends only 
on his own consumption, and which determines all 
his choices. He is characterised by an individualistic 
self-interested, utility-maximising, “rational” 
characterisation, while any ethical consideration is an 
exogenous variable in his preference. This notion of 
individual behaviour constitutes the ethical foundation 
as well as micro-foundations of economics as a 
discipline where all economic theories and analyses 
are based on this concept of man.
This account fits relatively well with the 
preconceptions of a particular interpretation of 
neoclassicism once pervading the Chicago School 
of George Stigler and Milton Friedman. The 
Chicago School is not, however, synonymous with 
neoclassicism per se. Such an account of decision 
making may certainly be disputed by others who 
fall within the broad neoclassical paradigm, but 
who would seek to deploy the analytical tools of 
optimisation without pre-specifying the kinds of 
aims, constraints, or even the nature of the decision 
maker. To go straight to the point, the most elementary 
conception of the rational neoclassical agent is 
nothing more than the following: a decision making 
agent will choose options that are most preferred 
given the constraints faced. The theory does not 
specify the options preferred, the precise nature of 
the constraints, or even the nature of the agent. The 
choice options are often presented in textbooks and 
specified in journal articles as being quantities of 
goods/services for the agent themselves alone, the 
constraints are often presented as being the prices of 
the goods/services and income or wealth, and the agent 
is often presented as being an autonomous individual 
person. But these are not necessary presentations or 
specifications. For example, it is not constituent of the 
theory that an optimizer must be indifferent to others 
– it is possible for an agent to prefer to assist others – 
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perhaps because they prefer other people to be happy 
over themselves. They may prefer to follow a moral 
imperative to help the poor than to spend income 
on themselves. Nor does it necessarily exclude the 
possibility of alteration of preferences in the light of 
new information, interaction with others, or newly 
emerging social norms. It is true that the preferences 
of the agent are still ‘their own’ and so the agent’s 
actions are in that narrow sense ‘self-directed’, but 
this does not logically entail psychopathic selfishness 
(e.g. Caplin & Schotter, 2010). It is precisely this 
broader conception of neoclassical axioms of rational 
decision making that informs proponents of modern 
Islamic economics who either develop what they 
regard as ‘Islamic’ conceptions of the rational agent, 
or test the effects of sharī’ah-based policies. 
That said, it does not follow that there are no 
problems with the neoclassical conception of decision-
making and thus with the neoclassical conception of 
decision-making of Muslims. One obvious problem is 
that of ‘realisticness’. It has always been problematic 
to claim that any human being actually makes the kinds 
of mathematically precise optimisation calculations 
presumed by neoclassical theory. As has been pointed 
out many times in different ways – perhaps most 
famously by Veblen (1898), Keynes (1936; 1937) and 
Simon (1955) – human beings simply don’t possess 
the cognitive capacities required to engage in such 
decision-making. Historically contingent customs, 
habits and heuristic norms are offered as better 
explanations of actual decision making. A related 
criticism is that standard theory has little to say about 
changes in (and firms’ manipulation of) preferences, 
which can obviously play a significant role in 
explaining microeconomic phenomena (Galbraith, 
1967). Certainly behavioural and experimental 
economics, which finds that actual human beings 
behave in ‘anomalously’ irrational ways (both in 
the consistency sense, and in the ‘selfish’ sense), is 
making some progress in transforming mainstream 
economic theory (Bardsley, Cubitt, Loomes, Moffatt, 
Starmer & Sugden, 2009). And what is to count as 
reasonable and prudent (as opposed to narrowly 
rational) decision making may depend on a whole 
host of factors, including both risk preferences and 
moral values. If such factors are not incorporated into 
a theoretical representation of agents, one is liable 
to systematically misunderstand actual decisions 
(Broome, 1999). As to what those preferences and 
values in fact are, however, is a strictly empirical 
matter. It cannot be determined a priori. 
In sum, it may well be true that a narrow and 
unsophisticated conception of utility and profit 
maximizing agents is both morally unacceptable 
and empirically inadequate for the purposes of a 
normatively informed Islamic economics, but it 
does not follow that everything in neoclassicism 
– especially more recent theoretical and empirical 
developments – should be rejected too, especially if 
such developments are useful to obtaining ultimate 
normative ends.
The second oversight by much of Islamic 
economics is that it narrows the field of possible 
alternatives to just neoclassicism and the neoclassical-
Keynesian synthesis. It thereby fails to acknowledge 
and engage with Post-Keynesian, Institutionalist, 
Ricardian political economy, neo-Marxian, and 
Austrian schools of thought, which hold quite different 
positive and normative conceptions of economic 
structures and relations to orthodoxy (Stilwell, 2006). 
Given that these alternative heterodox schools have 
not been engaged with in an in-depth fashion makes 
it difficult claim that they are irrelevant or useless to 
modern Islamic economics. 
The failure to engage with these heterodox 
schools is unfortunate because their insights because 
it is entirely possible that modern Islamic economics 
could indeed benefit or could at least draw some 
inspiration from them. First, these heterodox schools, 
some being over a century old, have had time to develop 
a wide range of substantive critiques of neoclassicism 
on methodological, logical and empirical grounds. If 
proponents of Islamic economics see the dominance 
of neoclassicism as a problem, one would expect them 
to investigate and mine these large, already existing 
bodies of work. Second, the heterodox schools share 
some broadly similar methodological concerns with 
modern Islamic economics – viz. the recognition that 
ideologies pervade economics as a social science, 
and the necessity for an interdisciplinary approach 
that incorporates social, political and ethical elements 
as essential to a more complete understanding of 
economic phenomena and solutions to problems. 
Third, the heterodox schools share some similar 
normative objectives with Islamic economics, 
especially related to poverty, wealth and income 
inequality, environmental destruction, exploitation 
of labour, and systemic crises of capitalism. And 
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finally, the heterodox schools recognize that the 
analysis of institutionalized power structures – 
political, economic and cultural – is necessary in 
order to understand how economic systems evolve 
and what barriers to ethical goals exist. The last 
of these – what may be called a politico-economic 
analysis – is conspicuously marginal in the modern 
Islamic economics literature. One finds, for example, 
very little discussion of the highly asymmetric nature 
of labour-capital power relations, the exploitation 
and discriminatory practices in labour markets, and 
the links between corporations’ economics interests 
and the formation of labour laws in Muslim-majority 
countries. The related topic of poverty as received 
somewhat more attention in Islamic economics, 
but still, there has been little by way of substantive 
analysis of the material economic interests, structural 
economic changes, and the relations between 
corporate power and state corruption (both overt 
and covert) which fundamentally contribute to the 
creation and maintenance of pervasive poverty in 
Muslim-majority countries. Given the human costs 
of poverty in terms of infant mortality and lower 
average life expectancy alone, both in Muslim and 
non-Muslim societies, one would have thought this 
topic would be the most pressing and prominent topic 
in modern Islamic economics. Instead, the greatest 
focus by orders of magnitude has been Islamic finance 
– a topic that is by and large of greatest interest and 
benefit to an economic elite seeking to ‘halālise’ its 
economic surpluses.  
Pluralism
As suggested above, modern Islamic economics 
of all types could benefit from openness to other 
schools of thought, including ‘secular’ ones. Indeed, 
one may tentatively suggest that such openness to a 
plurality of schools is itself consistent with an Islamic 
perspective. 
Pluralism in a broad sense is clearly indicated 
in the Qur’ān (2:148, 5:48, 21:92-93, 23:51, 49:13) 
as being ordained. The above cited passages point to 
different kinds of pluralism: different tribal groupings, 
different cultural mores and ways of life in general, 
different degrees of revelation, different legal systems, 
and different understandings (and misunderstandings) 
of divine ethics. One may speculate that insofar as one 
can conceptualise economics scholars as a group, it too 
exhibits plurality: there exist many sub-groups with 
different worldviews of how economic systems do 
and should function. Given the ordination of plurality 
more generally, one may say that a plurality of schools 
within the broad community of economics scholars 
is to be expected. As to the appropriate response to 
such pluralism, Muslims (at least) are commanded 
to ‘Vie, then, with one another in doing good works’ 
(Qur’ān, 5:48), which logically entails that one not 
ignore or dismiss out of hand what others seek to 
achieve, but rather understand, take into account, 
and respond to other groups in the most beneficial 
way. The implication that gaining understanding and 
knowledge via plurality is an imperative is reinforced 
in the passages ‘And of His signs is the creation of 
the heavens and the earth, and the difference of your 
languages and colours. Lo! herein indeed are portents 
for men of knowledge’ (Qur’ān, 30:22) and ‘We have 
created you all out of a male and a female, and have 
made you into nations and tribes, so that you might 
come to know one another’ (Qur’ān, 49:13).
The epistemological keys to this pluralistic 
‘unity in diversity’, especially as it relates to ways of 
systematically (or ‘scientifically’) conceptualizing and 
analyzing the social world (including its economics), 
is fallibilism and instrumentalism. 
Fallibilism is the position that humans do not 
necessarily possess perfectly complete or perfectly 
accurate knowledge, especially when it comes to 
empirical questions. The Qur’ān fairly clearly indicates 
that people are fallible beings. The story of Mūsa and 
Khidir is a striking example of no less than a prophet 
not possessing complete knowledge (Qur’ān, 18:65-
82). Also, the Qur’ānic formulation ‘alif-lam-mīm’ 
(e.g. Qur’ān, 2:1) is widely regarded as indicative of 
divine mystery beyond ordinary human knowledge, 
which should instill humility in the reader as a 
reminder of her or his epistemic fallibility. Further, the 
hadīth literature is also replete with examples of the 
first generation of Muslims (the sahāba) constantly 
requiring and requesting guidance and correction 
from the Prophet, thereby indicating the fallibility of 
the ‘best generation’. Finally, the epistemic fallibility 
of human beings is a theme emphasized by later 
scholarly luminaries. Hāmid al-Ghazālī, for example, 
famously argued in both his Deliverance from Error 
and his Incoherence of the Philosophers that rational 
faculties and demonstrative reasoning were limited 
because they could not achieve logically guaranteed 
knowledge. The upshot of this line of argument is that 
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beyond the realm of revelation, human knowledge is 
always fallible and so liable to revision and possible 
correction in the light of new information. 
Instrumentalism is the position that theories are 
first and foremost valued as tools to achieve certain 
goals.17 A tool, be it theoretical or material, may have 
been constructed with an incorrect metaphysics or 
with erroneous assumptions in mind, but that does 
not necessarily bear upon its usefulness to others. 
The Prophetic example of the use of the trench in 
warfare, which was sourced from Persian culture, is 
an example of openness to the use of tools apparently 
not of a revealed origin. This is also the import of 
the famous aphorism attributed to the Prophet, ‘Seek 
knowledge even as far as China’, indicating there 
may be knowledge of ‘foreign’ provenance that is 
useful to Muslims. The golden age of Islamic thought 
is also an excellent example of the borrowing and 
transformation of tools of ‘foreign’ provenance. 
Classical logic, mathematics, rhetoric and medical 
science, for example, were taken up and utilized with 
profit in the Arabic-Persian Muslim world despite 
their Greek origins, because it was recognized that 
despite the pagan metaphysical presuppositions often 
accompanying them, they could be powerful – and 
improvable – tools for solving problems relevant to 
Muslims and humanity in general.
Why should these lessons from the Qur’ān, the 
Prophetic teachings and from past scholars not be 
instructive to the microcosm of the Islamic economics 
community? It would seem to be both unfair and 
shortsighted to rule out court tout the economic 
theories, methodologies and methods of others simply 
on the grounds that it comes from ‘secular’ source or 
advocates ‘secular’ solutions to economic problems. 
If one interprets the Qur’ānic insights about plurality 
(noted above) as applying to the microcosm of 
scholarly economics community as much as it does to 
the macrocosm of the global community, then surely 
it behooves Muslim economists to learn from other 
schools of thought –via both their errors and successes, 
their bads and goods. To dismiss other perspectives 
on the a priori presupposition that one knows there is 
no success and no goodness in something implies the 
belief that God creates entities of literally no benefit 
17 There are a number of different methodological conceptions 
of instrumentalism (Mäki, 1998). The definition used 
above incorporates all of them.
to anyone in any respect. It also is suggestive of an 
intellectual arrogance that one can know everything 
about a multi-faceted school of thought, both now 
and its future course for all time, as if it were a simple 
fossil, never capable of change or new insights.     
An approach that is open and values scientific 
diversity is not, nor should it be uncritical or 
relativistic, however. To uncritically accept as true or 
valuable all theories, methods and methodologies can 
only lead to intellectual chaos and incoherence. Also, 
to not subject alternative views to critical interrogation 
indicates a lack of respect for those views, as it 
suggests that such views are simply not intellectually 
worthy of engagement. Uncritical acceptance is 
just as unfair and shortsighted as intolerant claims 
to infallibility. In sum, modern Islamic economics 
must be respectful and value diversity within itself 
and with regard to the wider scholarly community of 
economics if it is to grow and prosper. Diversity and 
critical engagement is necessary in order to affirm, 
if only by means of contrast, what is essential and 
distinctive about Islamic economics, to discover 
new insights provided by others that may be useful 
to Islamic economics, and to learn from the mistakes 
made within and outside Islamic economics. 
CONCLUDING COMMENT
Islamic economics as a modern academic 
discipline is still relatively young. As such, one 
should not expect its definition, its scope, its methods 
or its theoretical constructions, let alone its findings 
to be settled at this stage in its development. In fact, 
given that an essential feature of the discipline is 
its earnest moral motivation, its necessary appeal 
to religious texts, the grand, sprawling traditions 
of Islamic scholarship, and also its efforts to apply 
itself practically to a world often hostile to its ideals, 
one should not expect unanimity on any particular 
issue. There will, I venture to suggest, always be 
contestation over the substantive ethical foundations, 
over the proper relationship between theory and 
evidence, and over the validity and worth of particular 
practical interventions in the world, such as banking 
and finance. The disjunction between actual economic 
practices in Muslim-majority communities and the 
ideals of Islamic economics – be they theoretical 
or ethical – will be a perennial spur to critique and 
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debate. If modern Islamic economics were to broaden 
its horizons to include an examination of not just the 
innovations in neoclassicism but also the heterodox 
schools of secular economics, this will increase the 
range of methods and theoretical tools that it may 
profitably utilize to serve its normative ends. 
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